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Advisory Opinions of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights
BERT B. LOCKWOOD, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The regional arrangement for the protection of human rights in the
western hemisphere took an important step forward in 1978, with the en-
try into force of the American Convention on Human Rights and the sub-
sequent creation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights." The
Court offers a means not only of adjudicating disputes arising under the
Convention itself,2 but of generating advisory decisions on the Conven-
* Director, Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, University of Cincinnati College
of Law.
1. The American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature; San Jose, Costa
Rica, on Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force, July 18, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Human Rights
Convention]. For the official text, see ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS [hereinafter
cited as HAND-BOOK] 27, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.50 doc. 6 (1980). The text as it appears in OAS
Official Records, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970), is reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 673 (1970).
The following OAS member states have ratified the Convention: Barbados, Bolivia, Co-
lombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The United
States has signed but not ratified the Convention, consistent with its egregious record on the
ratification of human rights instruments. See generally U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS? (Lillich ed. 1981).
Art. 33 of the Convention provides for the competence of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights and reads in part as follows: "The following organs shall have compe-
tence with respect to matters relating to the fulfillment of the commitments made by the
States Parties to this Convention: ... The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, referred
to as 'the Court.'"
2. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 62. Art. 62 sets out the adjudicatory or
contentious jurisdiction of the Court and reads as follows:
1. A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adher-
ence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes
as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of
the Court on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of this
Convention. 2. Such declaration may be made unconditionally, on the condi-
tion of reciprocity, for a specified period, or for specific cases. It shall be
presented to the Secretary General of the Organization, who shall transmit
copies thereof to the other member states of the Organization and to the Sec-
retary of the Court. 3. The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases
concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Conven-
tion that are submitted to it, provided that the States Party to the case recog-
nize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration pur-
suant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement.
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tion and other human rights instruments of inter-American concern.3
While 17 of the 29 member states of the Organization of American States
have ratified the Convention, to date only four have recognized the juris-
diction of the Court in contentious cases pursuant to article 62.' Costa
Rica is the only state to have submitted an article 62 case.5 Recently the
Court decided the first two cases submitted to it under its advisory juris-
diction." This article will analyze those decisions and their importance to
the future development of procedures for the protection of human rights
in this hemis-phere.
While the European experience is encouraging with 19 of the 21
member states of the Council of Europe now recognizing the compulsory
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights7-it is important for
the Inter-American Court to gain stature and acceptance within the com-
munity so that states will shed their reluctance to submit themselves to
its compulsory jurisdiction. The advisory jurisdiction established by arti-
cle 64 of the Convention may offer the most effective means of demon-
strating the Court's usefulness and providing the Court with an opportu-
nity to develop a consistent and influential body of human rights
jurisprudence. With the decisions in its first two advisory cases the Court
is off to a good start. Both cases involved the interpretation of provisions
of the Convention, and the Court, acting unanimously in both, presented
articulate, well-reasoned opinions.
3. Human Rights Convention, supra, note 1, art. 64, set out in text accompanying note
12. Note also that individuals are not empowered to bring a case directly to the Court;
"[oinly the States Parties and the Commission shall have the right to submit a case to the
Court." Human Rights Convention, supra, note 1, art. 61.
4. The four states are Costa Rica, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela. Note that a state is
not deemed to have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court merely by ratifying the Conven-
tion. Acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction is optional and requires a separate declaration or
a special agreement. Nevertheless, all state parties to the Convention may permit the Court
on an ad hoc basis to adjudicate a specific dispute relating to the application of the Conven-
tion. For an excellent introduction to the Court see Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1982). See also Dunshee de Abranches, The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 79 (1981). On the topic of the inter-
American system for protecting human rights, see generally T. GUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS, &
D. SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS (1982).
5. Government of~ Ccost-ia (i the, M.atter o.f Vivi.,,fl,.,.,It. a!), N. GlOI/88
Decision of Nov. 13, 1981, Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
1982, OEA/Ser.L/III.5, doc. 13 at 13 (Sept. 23, 1982), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1424 (1981).
6. Other Treaties Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights), No. OC-1/82, Decision of Sept. 24, 1982, reprinted in 22
I.L.M. 51 (1083) [hereinafter cited as Consultative Jurisdiction; The Effect of Reservations
On the Entry Into Force of the American Convention (Arts. 74 and 75), No. OC-2/82, Deci-
sion of Sept. 24, 1982, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 37 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Effect of
Reservation].
7. Activities of the Council of Europe in the Field of Human Rights in 1982, H(83)1,
Strasbourg, Jan. 25, 1983, Council of Europe at 2.
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II. THE FIRST ADVISORY OPINION
Pursuant to article 52 of the Court's Rules of Procedure,' the Court
had before it written observations from a number of states and OAS or-
gans.9 In addition, the Court accepted amicus briefs from several non-
governmental organizations.10 In so doing, the Court set an important
precedent, implicitly recognizing the significant role played by non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGO's) in the development of human rights
law." The Court's first advisory opinion related to a request of the gov-
ernment of Peru'2 concerning the interpretation of article 64 of the Amer-
ican Convention granting advisory jurisdiction to the Court. Article 64
reads as follows:
1. The member states of the Organization may consult the Court
8. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Rules of Procedure, 44, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser. LiV/III.3/doc. 13, corr. 1 (1981) (corrected version reprinted in 20 I.L.M. (1289)
(1981).
9. In response to the Peruvian request for an advisory opinion, the following states and
OAS organs submitted written observations: Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Uruguay; the General Secretariat, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Juridical Committee, the Pan
American Institute of Geography and History, and the Permanent Council. See, Annual
Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 1982, 25. OEA/Ser. L/113.F, doc.
13(1982) [hereinafter cited as Annual Report].
10. With respect to the Peruvian request for an advisory opinion, the following nongov-
ernmental organizations submitted amicus briefs: Inter-American Institute on Human
Rights; The International Human Rights Law Group; The International League for Human
Rights; The Lawyer's Committee for International Human Rights; and the Urban Morgan
Institute for Human Rights at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. See, Annual
Report, supra note 9.
11. Since human rights law by definition erects limits on governmental actions, either
by establishing prohibitions on certain actions (such as arbitrary detention) or by creating
new obligations (such as education), it should not be surprising that few governments are
found in the forefront of promoting human rights.
For an analysis of the role played by NGO's, see Cassese, Progressive Transnational
Promotion of Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFrER THE UNIVERSAL DECLA-
RATION 249 (B. Ramcharen ed. 1979); Forsythe and Wiseberg, Human Rights Protection: A
Research Agenda, UNIvERsAL HUMAN RIGHTS, (Oct.-Dec. 1979); Scoble and Wiseberg,
Human Rights NGO's: Notes towards Comparative Analysis, 9 REvUE DES DRorrs DE
L'HOMME 611 (1976); Scoble and Wiseberg, The International League for Human Rights:
The Strategy of a Human Rights NGO, GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L 289 (1977); Scoble and
Wiseberg, Monitoring Human Rights Violations: The Role of Human Rights NGO's, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Rubin and Spiro eds.); Shestack, Sisyphus En-
dures: The International Human Rights NGO, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 89 (1978); Weissb-
rodt, The Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations in the Implementation
of Human Rights, 12 TEx. INr'L L.J. 293 (1977); Weissbrodt and McCarthy, Fact-Finding
by International Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 1
(1981). For current information on human rights activities of NGO's, see The Human
Rights Internet Reporter, a periodical published 5 times per year by the Human Rights
Internet.
12. Request for an Advisory Opinion Presented by the Government of Peru, reprinted
in Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 1982, 25. OEA/Ser. L/11.7,
doc. 13 (1982).
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regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties
concerning the protection of human rights in the American states.
Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed in Chapter X of
the Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by
the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court.
2. The Court, at the request of a member state of the Organiza-
tion, may provide that state with opinions regarding the compatibility
of any of its domestic laws with the aforesaid international
instruments.
The Peruvian request was concerned with the meaning of the phrase "or
of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the Ameri-
can states." Peru offered, in the alternative, three possible interpretations
of "other treaties": (a) only those treaties adopted within the framework
or under the auspices of the inter-American system; (b) treaties included
solely among the American states, that is, those treaties in which only
American states are parties; (c) all treaties in which one or more Ameri-
can states are parties.13
Before deciding the question, the Court found it necessary to ascer-
tain the extent of its advisory jurisdiction, noting that limits to that juris-
diction are not clearly spelled out in article 64.' The Court found that
article 64 confers on it the most extensive advisory jurisdiction of any
international tribuna in existence today.5 All organs of the OAS listed in
Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization and every OAS member
state, whether a party to the Convention or not, are empowered to seek
advisory opinions." Additionally, the Court's advisory jurisdiction is not
limited to the Convention but extends to other treaties concerning the
protection of human rights in the American states.17 All OAS member
states have the right to request advisory opinions on the compatibility of
any of their domestic laws with the aforementioned international
instruments. 8
In contrast, the Court noted, the International Court of Justice may
not receive requests for advisory opinions from member states of the
United Nations. Rather, only the General Assembly and the Security
Council, and under certain conditions other organs and specialized agen-
cies of the United Nations, are authorized to request advisory opinions
from that body.'" The European Court of Human Rights may receive a
13. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 53.
14. Id. at 54.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. U.N. CHARTER, art. 96, paras. 1 & 2 reading as follows:
1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the Interna-
tional Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may
at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advi-
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request for an advisory opinion only from the Committee of Ministers
and that opinion may deal only with legal questions concerning the inter-
pretation of the Convention and its protocols.2 0 Furthermore, the protocol
excludes from the advisory jurisdiction of that tribunal the interpretation
of any question relating to the content or scope of the rights or freedoms
defined in these instruments, or any other question which the European
Commission on Human Rights, the European Court, or the Committee of
Ministers might have to consider in consequence of any proceeding that
could be instituted in accordance with the Convention.
2 1
The Court next attempted to delineate the precise limits of its advi-
sory jurisdiction. Looking to the preparatory work of the American Con-
vention, the Court determined that the drafters' intention was to cast the
Court's advisory jurisdiction "in the broadest terms possible. '22 Nonethe-
less, certain restrictions flowed from the Court's status as an inter-Ameri-
can juridical institution. The Court held that is advisory jurisdiction did
not extend to international agreements concluded by non-member states
of the inter-American system nor to legal provisions governing the struc-
ture or operation of international organs or institutions not belonging to
the inter-American system.2 s These limitations, however, did not necessa-
rily restrict the power of the Court to interpret a treaty that is directly
related to the protection of human rights in a member state of the inter-
American system.2
4
To illustrate the Court's view of the scope of its advisory powers,
sory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their
activities
See L. Goodrich, E. Hambro & A. Simons, Charter of the U.N.: Commentary and Docu-
ments (1969) at 560: "Thus, a state can obtain an advisory opinion from the Court only if its
proposal is adopted by one of the organizations or agencies authorized to make such a
request."
20. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, done at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
COLLECTED TEXTS (11th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as European Convention]. Protocol No.
2 (Sept. 21, 1970) Article (1) of this Convention reads: "The Court may, at the request of
the Committee of Ministers, give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the inter-
pretation of the Convention and the Protocols thereto." For a comparison of the European
and American Conventions, see, Buergenthal, The American and European Conventions on
Human Rights: Similarities and Differences, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 155 (1981).
21. European Convention, supra note 20, Protocol No. 2, Article 1(2) Sept. 21, 1970.
See L. Sohn and T. Buergenthal, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OP HUMAN RIGHTS at 1106
(1973): "[T]he limitations which Article 1(2) of the Protocol imposes on the Court's power
to render advisory opinions taken together with the fact that only the Committee of Minis-
ters may request them, greatly diminishes the significance of the Court's advisory
functions."
For an excellent study, see A.H. Robertson, Advisory Opinions of the Court of Human
Rights, reprinted in 1 RENE CASSIN AMICORUM DISCIPULORUMQUE LIBER 224-46 (Paris, 1969).
22 Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 55.
23. Id. at 56.
24. Id.
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suppose Uruguay were to request an advisory opinion on its obligations
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 25 Under
the Court's analysis, the Court would not be empowered to pass upon the
appropriateness of procedures used by the Human Rights Committee set
up under the International Covenant, but it could adjudicate the question
of whether or not Uruguay was meeting its obligations under that instru-
ment. As the matrix of ratifications of human rights treaties included be-
low points out, 14 of the 26 OAS member states have ratified the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 11 have ratified the
Optional Protocol permitting individual petitions.
A second source of limitations on the Court's advisory jurisdiction
derives from the unique role envisioned for the Court by the drafters of
the Convention. This role was to include "assist[ing] the American States
in fulfilling their international human rights obligations and . . . as-
sist[ing] the different organs of the inter-American system to carry out
the functions assigned to them in this field. ' '2 6 The Court was concerned
with the possibility that a state might invoke the advisory jurisdiction of
the Court out of a desire to avoid the contentious jurisdiction mandated
by the Convention. For example, if the Commission were investigating a
state action, the state might seek an advisory opinion upon the matter
under investigation. This would prevent the Commission from bringing
the matter up under the Court's contentious jurisdiction, thus enabling
the state to avoid a binding determination. To sanction this sort of "race
to the courthouse" strategy would clearly defeat the purposes of the Con-
vention. Unlike most treaties, human rights treaties do not involve recip-
rocal interests of states; rather, they provide for individual rights and lim-
itations upon the actions of states. If a state were permitted to
circumvent the binding nature of a judgment simply by invoking the
Court's advisory jurisdiction, the Court would impede those individual
rights it was set up to protect.27
Although article 64 and the rest of the Convention are silent as to the
question, the Court concluded that its advisory jurisdiction is not
25. In 1970 Uruguay ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967). For a thorough review of Uruguay's poor record of compliance
with the Covenant, see THE INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, URUGUAY'S HUMAN
RIGHTS RECORD: COMMENTS, ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND INI'OUKMA7ION ON THE Co.mT
oF URUGUAY'S 1982 REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (1982).
26. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 57-58.
27. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 63(1), does, however, provide a
remedy:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom pro-
tected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be en-
sured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule,
if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that consti-
tuted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensa-
tion be paid to the injured party.
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mandatory but permissive. 8 This holding is consistent with the jurispru-
dence of the International Court of Justice." Thus the Court may decide
on a case-by-case basis whether to accept or reject a request for an ad-
visory opinion. The Court's broad discretionary powers are not, however,
to be viewed as totally unlimited.3 0 Before it may refrain from honoring a
request for an opinion, "[t]he Court must have compelling reasons
founded in the conviction that the request exceeds the limits of its advi-
sory jurisdiction under the Convention .. .Moreover, every decision by
the Court declining to render an advisory opinion must conform to the
provisions of Article 66 of the Convention,3 1 which require that reasons be
given for the decision. ' 2
It is interesting to note that the Court's concern with bogus requests
for advisory opinions was anticipated in a "Model American Convention
on Terrorism," drafted by the Standing Committee on World Order
Under Law of the American Bar Association. 3 One of the unique features
of the Draft Convention is that it provides a built-in procedure for utiliz-
ing the advisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court.34 When a state
receives a request for extradition of a person under the terms of the
treaty, and the state believes that the person may be subjected to perse-
cution in the requesting state, it may request an advisory opinion from
the Court. 5 The drafters of the Draft Convention, realizing that an extra-
dition request might be referred by a state which sought in reality not to
prosecute the alleged offender but rather to avoid his prosecution by re-
turning him to a safe haven, included a provision defeating such fraudu-
28. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 58.
29. See, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, (1950)
I.C.J. 65, 271-72, distinguishing Statute of Eastern Carelia, (1923) P.C.I.J. Ser. B, No. 5 and
recognizing the ICJ's discretionary jurisdiction in advisory cases wherein the question
presented is directly related to an actual dispute between states.
'30. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 58.
31. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 66 reads:
1. Reasons shall be given for the judgment of the Court. 2. If the judgment
does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges,
any judge shall be entitled to have his dissenting or separate opinion attached
to the judgment.
32. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra, note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 58.
33. Lockwood, The Model American Convention On the Prevention and Punishment
of Certain Serious Forms of Violence Jeopardizing Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 13
RUTGERS L.J. 579 (1982).
34. Id. at 596. Article 9 of the Model Convention reads:
Upon receipt of a request for extradition for an offense included in Article 1, a
Contracting State may refer the matter to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights pursuant to Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights
for an advisory opinion as to whether granting the request for extradition
would violate the provisions of this Convention. In like manner, a Contracting
Party, which has made a request for extradition for an offense included in Ar-
ticle 1, may refer the matter to the Inter-American Court for an advisory
opinion.
35. Model Convention, supra note 34, art. 9.
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lent requests. 6 They were particularly concerned with the problem of a
state making an extradition request in favor of a "secret agent" who may
have committed acts of terrorism in another state.37 If such a case were to
reach the Inter-American Court, the Court-under the authority of its
present decision-could refuse to grant an advisory opinion. 38
Although the Court did not specifically raise the issue, its decision
regarding the permissive nature of its advisory jurisdiction implicitly ad-
dresses another potentially troublesome situation. Cases may arise in
which the Court is called upon to interpret a treaty which establishes a
separate tribunal for the adjudication of conflicts arising under the treaty.
For example, note again that eleven member states of the OAS have rati-
fied the optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and and
Political Rights. 9 Under the provisions of the protocol, an individual may
lodge a complaint against a ratifying state with the Human Rights Com-
mittee.' 0 If the advisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court were
mandatory, the state could avoid an unfavorable binding decision in the
Human Rights Committee by raising the matter before the Inter-Ameri-
can Court pursuant to article 64. Under the authority of the present deci-
sion, the Court could refrain from complying with the request.,1 Clearly,
this is sound judicial policy. Just as the Court seeks to avoid institutional
conflict within the inter-American system,"2 so should it respect those
parallel world bodies set up for the protection of human rights. By recog-
nizing the permissive nature of its advisory jurisdiction, the Court ac-
36. Lockwood, supra note 33 at 595-6. Article 6 of the Model Convention states:
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to
extradite if the requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the
request for extradition for an offense included in Article 1 has been maintained
for the purpose of obstructing or preventing the prosecution or punishment of
a person alleged to have committed an offense included within Article 1.
37. Lockwood, supra note 33 at 587.
38. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 58.
39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 25, and accompa-
nying text.
40. Id. Art. 1 of the optional protocol provides in part:
A State Party to the Covenenat that becomes a party to the present Protocol
recognizes the competence of the [Human Rights Committee] to receive and
consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim
to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in
the Covennt.
The Human Rights Committee is provided for by art. 28 of the Inter-national Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.
41. The hypothetical request would probably fall within the conclusions set forth in
Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 59: "Finally the Court has to consider the
circumstances of each individual case and if, for compelling reasons, it declines to render an
opinion lest it exceed the aforementioned limitations and distort its advisory jurisdiction, it
must do so by means of an opinion, containing the reasons for its refusal to comply with the
request." Compare the comment of Fitzmaurice, infra, note 43, regarding the similar prob-
lem of the Inter-national Court of Justice facing a case falling within the concurrent juris-
diction of a treaty tribunal.
42. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, I.L.M. 56.
VOL. 13:2-3
ADVISORY OPINIONS
knowledged that as a regional institution it is complementary to other
tribunals at the global level.4"
The Court next turned to the specific question presented by the Pe-
ruvian request, i.e., which of the three alternatives44 offered the correct
interpretation of the phrase "or of other treaties concerning the protec-
tion of human rights in the American states."'48 The Court settled upon
the broadest of the three alternatives, concluding that the Court may
properly interpret any human rights treaty to which one or more Ameri-
can states are parties."' In reaching its decision, the Court relied on tradi-
tional international law methods of interpretation, particularly those
codified in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties. 47 The nub of the problem as the Court saw it was determining
43. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has addressed this problem with reference to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. Fitzmaurice maintains that where an advisory case may conflict with
the jurisdiction of a treaty tribunal, the issuance of an advisory opinion runs the risk of
frustrating the expectation interests of the parties to the treaty. The problem cannot be
disposed of by simply citing the non-binding character of an advisory opinion, since an
opinion would surely affect future interpretations by the treaty tribunal and might be
deemed conclusive as to some questions. "The difficulty," he concludes, "is one which, like
others in the field, cannot be solved by any general formula, and its solution must depend
on the individual circumstances of each case." Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice 1951-4, 34 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 147 (1958). Even though the
particular state requesting an advisory opinion of the Court would not be frustrated by the
rendering of an opinion, it is clear in the hypothetical that the expectations of the parties to
the human rights instrument would be frustrated if the protections could be circumvented.
For an indepth examination of the scope of the International Court of Justice's advisory
jurisdiction, see K. KErrH, THE ExTENT OF THE ADvIsORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTrRNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1971); D. Pratap, THE ADvisony JURISDICriON OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT (1972); I. Shihata, THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE
ITS OWN JURISDICTION (1968).
44. Supra, at text accompanying note 13.
45. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 64.
46. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 65.
47. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, UN
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/27/Corr.1 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M.
679 (1969) and 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 875 (1969). [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. Art.
31 provides:
General Rule of Interpretation 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for
the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise in addition to the
text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all
the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;,
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in conne-xion
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a)any subse-
quent agreement between the parties regarding the interpre-tation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regard-
ing its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in
1984
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what international obligations the American states intended to make sub-
ject to interpretation by advisory opinion. 48 In making this determination,
the Court found, it was not useful to distinguish between multilateral and
bilateral treaties, nor to look to the main purpose of the treaty which is
the source of the obligation.49 Rather, the ordinary meaning of the terms
of article 64 itself, viewed in light of the object and purpose of the Con-
vention, provided the appropriate guide to construction."
Applying the ordinary meaning rule, the Court held that the phrase
"American States" in article 6411 embraces all states which may ratify or
adhere to the Convention in accordance with article 74, i.e., all member
states of the OAS. 2" Further, the Court could find no compelling reason
why human rights obligations incurred by American states under treaties
concluded outside the inter-American system, or with non-American
states as parties, should be excluded from its advisory jurisdiction. 53 In
reaching this result the Court looked to the text of article 64,51 the object
and purpose of the Convention,5 5 the rules of interpretation set forth in
article 29 of the Convention,56 the practice of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights,5 7 and the preparatory work of the American
Convention.5 8
The ordinary meaning of the text of article 64 was held not to compel
a narrow interpretation.5 9 "Since a restrictive purpose was not expressly
the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term
if it is established that the parties so intended.
Article 32 provides:
Supplementary means of interpretation Recourse may be had to supplemen-
tary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and
the circumstances of its conclu-sion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting
from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the inter-
pretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure;
or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
48. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 59.
49. Id. Under this reasoning it does not matter that the protection of human rights is
not the principal object of the treaty from which the obligation stems. Objections arising
under the UN Charter or the Charter of the OAS-instruments which are not primary
targeted at human rights-would therefore be subject to interpretation by advisory opinion
in the Inter-American Court.
50. Id. at 59-60. Here the Court applies a customary rule of interpretation of interna-
tional agreements as codified in art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 47.
51. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 64 set out at text accompanying note
12.
52. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 60.
53. Id. at 64.
54. Id. at 60-61.
55. Id. at 61.
56. Id. at 61-62.
57. Id. at 62-63.
58. Id. at 63.
59. Id. at 60.
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articulated, it cannot be presumed to exist."60 In further support of a
broad interpretation, the Court noted that the Convention itself urged an
integrated view of the regional and universal systems.6' For example, the
Convention makes repeated references to instruments that are not inter-
American in character.6 2 Article 29, which contains rules governing the
interpretation of the Convention "clearly indicates an intention not to
restrict the protection of human rights to determinations that depend on
the source of the obligations,""3 the Court found. Not only does the arti-
cle make express reference to the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man "and other international acts of the same nature, 6 4 it fur-
ther provides that nothing in the Convention may be interpreted as "re-
stricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by
virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to
which one of the said states is a party."" It is difficult to imagine any
stronger textual language in support of the proposition that the Court, in
its role as the authorized interpreter of the Convention, is empowered to
look beyond the Convention to any human rights treaty entered into by
one or more American State.6
60. Id. Moreover, as the Court might have noted, nothing in the Rules of Procedure of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, supra note 8, indicates that the judges should
propound a restrictive interpretation of article 64. To the contrary, article 50 of the Rules
repeats the language of article 64: "1. If an interpretation is requested of other treaties
concerning the protection of human rights in the American States, as provided for in Article
64.1 .. " Article 51 of the Rules also parallels the wording of article 64(2) which it imple-
ments, giving no indication that the "international instruments" mentioned are exclusively
regional and not universal.
61. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 61.
62. See inter alia the Convention's Preamble, noting that "these principles have been
set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States in the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man, and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
.. .have been reaffirmed and refined in other international instruments, worldwide as well
as regional in scope" (emphasis added); art. 22(7), establishing the right to receive political
asylum "in accordance with the legislation of the state international conventions. . ."; art.
26, adopting the economic, social and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the OAS
as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires; art. 27(1), providing for emergency supervision
of the Convention's guarantees when "such measures are not inconsistent with .. . [a
Party's] other obligations under international law ... "
63. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 61.
64. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 29(d).
65. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 29(b).
66. Article 29 may be said to explain the reference in article 64(1) to "other treaties"
and to clarify the content of article 64(2). The expression employed in article 29, "another
convention to which one of the said states is a party," is not by its terms limited to Ameri-
can instruments, nor does it contain any qualifying or limiting modifier other than the logi-
cally implied requirement that one of the parties to the instrument be an American state.
This is apparently the only limit that was intended on the Court's advisory jurisdiction, and
explains why the second paragraph of article 64 which authorizes member states of the OAS
to request advisory opinions was included.
It is also worth noting that standing to request advisory opinions concerning "other
treaties" was originally reserved to the principal organs of the OAS and was later extended
to the member states, whereas the member states had from the first draft on the right to
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The Court went on to note the practice of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights.67 In particular the Court found that the Com-
mission, it its reports and resolutions, had made repeated reference to
treaties concluded outside the inter-American system which entailed obli-
gations of American states.6" Since the Court could not always review an
interpretation made by the Commission of a country's treaty obligation
unless its advisory jurisdiction was held to encompass at least as broad a
field as that assumed by the Commission, it was found to be in the best
interests of the states themselves for the Court to construe its article 64
powers broadly. 9
In the preparatory work on the American Convention the Court
found two facts in support of its conclusion. First, by the time the draft-
ers of the Convention delineated the Court's advisory jurisdiction, the
more narrowly drawn provisions of article 1 of Protocol No. 2 of the Eu-
ropean Convention7 0 had already been adopted. 1 Thus in shaping the ex-
pansive terms of article 64, the drafters purposefully eschewed the narrow
boundaries of the European system.7 2 Second, the Court noted that after
the drafting of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights73 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
request an advisory opinion with respect to the compatibility between those "other treaties"
and their domestic law. See Conferencia Especializada Interamericana Sobre Derechos
Humanos: Actas Y Documentos, OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.2 (1969) at 377. Article 19 itself under-
went only minor stylistic modifications and paragraphs (b) and (d) came through the pro-
cess practically unchanged. Since article 29 makes such a forceful call for a broad interpre-
tation of the Court's advisory jurisdiction, it is indeed significant that it underwent virtually
no change; article 64, by contrast, would seem to have been modified to comport with article
29.
67. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 62.
68. Id. 62-63. The Court specifically cited the following country reports and resolution
of the Inter-American Commission: El Salvador (OAS/Ser. L/V/II.46, doc. 23, rev.1, Novem-
ber 17, 1979) at 37-38; Cuba (OAS/Ser. L/V/II.48, doc. 24, December 14, 1979) at 9; Argen-
tina (OAS/Ser. L./V/II.49, doc. 19, April 11, 1980) 24-25; Nicaragua (OAS/Ser. L/V/II.53,
doc. 25, June 30, 1981) 31; Colombia (OAS/Ser. L/V/II.53, doc. 22, June 30, 1981) 56-57;
Guatemala (OAS/Ser. L/V/II.53, doc. 21, rev. 2, October 13, 1981) 16-17; Bolivia (OAS/Ser.
L/V/II.53, doc. 6, rev. 2, October 31, 1981) 20-21; Case 7481 - Acts which occurred in Cara-
coles (Bolivia), Resolution No. 30/82 (OAS/Ser. L/V/II.55, doc. 54, March 8, 1982).
The Commission's status was raised to that of a consultative organ of the OAS by the
Amended Protocol of OAS Charter, signed Feb. 27, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847,
721 U.N.T.S. 324. For a thorough discussion of the Commission's on-site observations see
Norris, Observations in Loco: Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, TEx. INT'L L.J. 46 (1980), see also Research Note, Synopsis of the 1980-
81 Country Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 4 HUMAN RTS. Q.
406 (1982).
69. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 63.
70. European Convention, supra notes 20 and 21.
71. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 63.
72. Id.
73. International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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Rights and its optional protocol,"' the OAS Council consulted member
states of the organization in June of 1967 regarding the advisability of
continuing the work on an American Convention. 75 Ten of the twelve
states responding to the inquiry favored continuing the work on the Con-
vention, with the understanding that an effort would be made to draw
upon the provisions of the UN Covenants.7 Thus the history of the Con-
vention demonstrated a tendency to conform the regional system to the
universal system, a tendency which was reflected in the text of the Con-
vention itself.
7
A number of the submissions addressed to the Court by member
states and OAS organs under article 52 of the Court's Rules of Proce-
dure78 urged a more restrictive interpretation of article 64 . s The concern
was evinced in these submissions that conflicting interpretations might
result from having more than one international body pass upon particular
instruments."0 Noting that the possibility of conflicting interpretations is
a fairly common phenomenon in all legal systems that are not strictly
hierarchical in character, the Court was not persuaded."' It further noted
that the broad jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice even
made it possible for the ICJ to pass upon instruments framed within the
inter-American system. 2 Another concern expressed in some of the sub-
missions was that decisions regarding non-inter-American treaties could
affect states which had little to do with the Convention or the Court and
74. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
75. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 63.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
79. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 64.
80. Id. For a discussion of the problems that may arise from conflicting interpretations
by international human rights tribunals, see Meron, Norm Making and Supervision in In-
ternational Human Rights: Reflections on Institutional Order, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 754
(1982). Meron notes a concern that, given the growing number of U.N. and regional bodies
interpreting human rights instruments, it may be necessary to achieve a greater degree of
coordination among these bodies in order to prevent conflicting interpretations of human
rights norms. While this concern has merit, there is also merit in allowing diverse bodies to
address common issues arising under the respective instruments. There has been too little
rather than too much chalking out of the substantive meaning of the human rights norms;
as with the development of the common law, the product of diverse bodies may yield greater
insight into the appropriate rule of law than would complete judicial harmony. One of the
chief merits of the Inter-American Court's decision is that it permits the Court to examine a
wide complement of human rights instruments when considering a particular case. For one
approach to coordinating the procedural and normatic human rights mechanisms estab-
lished by the American Convention with those of the U.N., see Piza, Coordination of the
Mechanisms for the Protection of Human Rights in the American Convention with Those
Established by the United Nations, 30 Am. L. REV. 167 (1981).
81. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 64.
82. Id., See sources listed supra at note 43 on the scope of the ICJ's advisory
jurisdiction.
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which could not even be represented before the Court. 3 This matter, the
Court found, was disposed of by its decision to proceed on an ad hoc basis
and to view its advisory jurisdiction as permissive.8 4 A final safeguard
with respect to these concerns was the fact that the Court's advisory ju-
risdiction by definition involved non-binding decisions."
Although the Court did not directly confront the issue, it seems fair
to conclude that it would define the term "treaties" in article 64 to be
generic in character, encompassing a broad range of international instru-
ments bearing upon human rights.86 Supporting this conclusion is the
text of the Vienna Convention" 7-cited by the Court as a key guide to
interpretations-which defines a "treaty" as "an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by international
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments whatever its particular -designation.' 9 (Emphasis added.)
The full breadth of the term "treaty" as used in the Vienna Convention is
indicated by the International Law Commission in its report to the UN
General Assembly: "[I]n addition to 'treaty,' 'convention,' and 'protocol,'
one not infrequently finds titles such as 'declaration,' 'charter,' 'covenant,'
'pact,' 'act,' 'statute,' 'agreement,' 'concordat,' whilst names like 'declara-
tion,' 'agreement,' and modus vivendi may well be found given both to
formal and less formal types of agreements."'"
The International Law Commission concluded that "treaty" is used
throughout the Vienna Convention, then in draft form, "as a generic term
covering all forms of international agreement in writing concluded be-
tween States,"'91 and that a majority of jurists accept this usage.2 The
Court itself attached heavy importance to article 29 of the Convention,
which prohibits any interpretation which would exclude or limit "the ef-
fect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and
other international acts of the same nature may have."'93 Thus the plain
international meaning of "treaty" should be deemed to encompass such
instruments as, inter alia, the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, 94 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,"' the OAS
83. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 64.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 65.
86. The question of whether instruments such as the American Declaration on the
Rights anrd Dtie nf Man, which are not treaties per se, fall within the scope of article 64,
was raised in Buergenthal, supra note 4 at 243.
87. Supra note 47.
88. Id. and accompanyint text.
89. Vienna Convention, supra note 47, art. 2, para. 1(a).
90. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966), reprinted in 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169, 188; U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.
A/1966/Add. 1.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Supra, note 63 and accompanying text.
94. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948, reprinted in
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Charter,96 and the two UN Human Rights Covenants;9 7 the Court's advi-
sory jurisdiction would seem to extend to such instruments.
III. THE SECOND ADVISORY OPINION
In the second case, the Court again had before it the written observa-
tions of several American states and OAS organs,9 s and the amicus briefs
of two nongovernmental organizations. 9 The Inter-American Commis-
sion's request for an advisory opinion presented the following question:
At what point in time does a state become a party to the American Con-
vention on Human Rights, where the state has deposited an instrument
of ratification or adherence, containing one or more reservations to the
Convention, with the General Secretariat of the OAS? 100 The request was
necessitated by an ambiguity in the American Convention's provisions
pertaining to ratifications and reservations.10' On the other hand, article
74(2) provides, in pertinent part, that with respect to a state depositing
an instrument of ratification or adherence after the Convention's entry
into force "the Convention shall enter into force on the date of the de-
posit of its instrument of ratification or adherence."' 0 2 On the other hand,
article 75 provides that "[t]his Convention shall be subject to reservations
only in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties signed on May 23, 1969. "13 In order to understand the
source of confusion it will be necessary to set forth the relevant provisions
of the Vienna Convention. Articles 19 and 20 provide:
Article 19
Formulation of reservations
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding
to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a)the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b)the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, 17, OEA/Ser. L/V/11.50 doc. 6 (1980).
95. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
96. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30 1948, 2 U.S.T.S. 2394;
T.I.A.S. No. 2361; 119 U.N.T.S. 48.
97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A.
Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 9(1966); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200
A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
98. The following states and OAS organs submitted written observations; Costa Rica,
Mexico, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the United States, the Permanent Council, the
Inter-American Juridical Committee and the General Secretariat.
99. Amicus briefs were submitted by the International Human Rights Law Group and
the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights of the University of Cincinnati College of
Law.
100. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 38-39.
101. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, arts. 74, 75.
102. Id. art. 74(2).
103. Id. art. 75.
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include the reservation in question, may be made; or
(c)in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reserva-
tion is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Article 20
Acceptance of an objection to reservations
1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any
subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the
treaty so provides.
2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating
States and the object and purpose of a treaty that the application of
the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condi-
tion of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a reserva-
tion requires acceptance by all the parties.
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international or-
ganization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the
acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the
treaty otherwise provides:
(a) acceptance of another contracting State of a reservation consti-
tutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that other
State if or when the treaty is in force for those States;
(b) an objection of another contracting State to a reservation does not
preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting
and reserving States unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed
by the objecting State;
(c) an act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and
containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other con-
tracting State has accepted the reservation.
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty
otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted
by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the
end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reserva-
tion or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by
the treaty, whichever is later.'"
The Court began its discussion by noting that article 74(2) of the
Convention is silent as to whether it applies exclusively to ratifications
and adherences which contain no reservations or whether it also applies
to those with reservations. 10 5 The General Secretariat of the OAS, as de-
positary of the Convention, read the relevant provisions of the Vienna
...... t o ean that a reerving tate is not a party to the Conven-
tion until the expiration of one year from the date on which other state
parties received notification of the reservations or expressed their consent
to be bound by the treaty with respect to their reservations.10 6 This view
104. Vienna Convention, supra note 47, arts. 19, 20.
105. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 42.
106. Request for an Advisory Opinion Presented by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, reprinted in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 1982, 28. OEA/Ser. L/III.7, doc. 13 (1982). [hereinafter cited as Request for an Advi-
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was further advanced in the written observations submitted to the Court
by the United States.1 0 7 In its observations, the United States argued that
paragraphs 4(c) and 5 of article 20 were incorporated into the American
Convention by reference in article 75.'08 Paragraph 4(c) of that article
provides that an act expressing a state's consent to be bound by the
treaty and containing a reservation is effective when at least one other
state party has accepted the reservation. Paragraph 5 presumes such an
acceptance by another state if the latter has raised no objection to the
reservation in twelve months after notification of the reservation." 9 Thus,
reading article 20, the United States concluded that the Secretariat Gen-
eral may not deposit an instrument of ratification containing a reserva-
tion until a state party accepts the reservation, such acceptance being
presumed of any state that fails to object within a twelve-month
period. 10
This question is of great importance to the Inter-American Commis-
sion because its powers are different respecting states that are parties to
the Convention and those that are not. Article 33 of the Convention
grants the Commission competence with respect to matters relating to the
fulfillment by state parties of their commitments thereunder."' Article
41(f) authorizes the Commission to take actions -on petitions and other
communications pursuant to its authority under articles 44 through 51."1
The effect of petitions and communications to the Commission is differ-
ent, depending upon whether the state concerned is a party to the Con-
vention."13 It is necessary for the Commission to know when a particular
state is a party to the Convention in order to apply the correct procedures
to petitions and communications, as well as to apply the relevant norms.
The provisions of the Vienna Convention dealing with reservations" 4
provide for the application of different rules to different categories of
treaties, the Court found."' Thus it was necessary for the Court to deter-
mine how the American Convention was to be classified for purposes of
the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention."' In so doing, the
Court was to look for guidance to the language of article 75 and the pur-
sory Opinion.]
107. Observations of the Government of the United States of American Concerning the
Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Sept. 3, 1982).
108. Id. at 6-7.
109. Vienna Convention, supra note 47, arts. 20(4)(c), 20(5).
110. Observations of the Government of the United States of American Concerning the
Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Sept. 3, 1982) 9.
111. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 33.
112. Id. at arts. 41(f), 44-51.
113. Request for an Advisory Opinion, supra note 106.
114. Vienna Convention, supra note 47, arts. 19-23.
115. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 42.
116. Id.
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pose for which it was designed." 7 Turning to article 19, the Court deter-
mined that the reference to the Vienna Convention in article 75 was a
reference to paragraph (c) of Article 19.1' Paragraph (a) was inapplicable
in that the Convention does not prohibit reservations; likewise, paragraph
(b) was inapplicable since the Convention does not specify permissible
reservations.1 9 It thus followed that paragraph (c), permitting reserva-
tions which are not "incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty, '120 was the governing provision.12 ' The Court's interpretation was
buttressed by reference to the preparatory work of the Convention, which
indicated that the drafters wished to provide for a flexible reservations
policy.122
The Court applied a similar analysis to article 20 of the Vienna Con-
vention. The chief question with respect to article 20 was whether reser-
vations to the Convention required acceptance by the other state parties.
If not, then a ratifying state would be deemed a party to the Convention
upon the deposit of the instrument of ratification, regardless of whether
the ratification was accompanied by a reservation. On the other hand, if
acceptance of reservations by other state parties was a prerequisite under
the Convention, a reserving state would not be deemed a party until at
least one other state party had accepted the reservation. As mentioned
earlier,12 3 the latter view was adopted by the General Secretariat of the
OAS and advanced in the written observations submitted to the Court by
the United States. The Court, however, concluded differently. Noting
that the Convention did not involve a limited number of negotiating
states exchanging reciprocal rights, nor did the application of the treaty
in its entirety to all of the parties appear to be an essential condition of
the consent of each to be bound, the Court found that paragraph 2 of
article 20 was inapplicable. 2 4 Likewise, paragraph 3 could be eliminated
since the Convention was not a constituent instrument of an international
organization. 2 The Court's determination thus came down to a choice
between paragraph 1 and paragraph 4 of article 20. In selecting the ap-
proach codified in paragraph 1, the Court held that reservations to the
Convention do not require acceptance by any other contracting states. 2 6
Thus it followed that a reserving state is bound from the date of the de-
117. Id.
118. Id. at 44.
119. Id.
120. Vienna Convention, supra note 47, art. 19, para. (c).
121. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 44.
122. Id. at 44-46. The Court cited to the proceedings and documents of the Specialized
Inter-American Conference on Human Rights, which met in San Jose, Costa Rica from Nov.
7 to 22, 1969, to adopt the Convention. These materials are reprinted in Conferencia Es-
pecializada Interamericana Sobre Derechos Humanos, OEA/Ser. K/XVI.2 (1973).
123. Supra notes 106 and 107 and accompanying text.
124. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 LL.M. 46.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 49.
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posit of its instrument of ratification." 7 It should be noted that the
Court's view reflected the interpretation put forward by the Urban Mor-
gan Institute for Human Rights of the College of Law at the University of
Cincinnati in its amicus brief.
The Court's views were strongly guided by the unique nature of
human rights treaties. In most treaties, the Court noted, reciprocal rights
are exchanged for the mutual benefit of the state parties.'28 Article 20(4)
of the Vienna Convention is geared to the demands of this traditional
system. 12 9 While it liberalizes the ratification process insofar as it permits
reservations, article 20(4) still requires that at least one state party accept
the reservation before the treaty is operative as to the reserving party.
Further, it enables the other contracting states to accept or reject the
reservations to determine whether they wish to enter into treaty rela-
tionss with the reserving state. By contrast, modern human rights treaties
do not have as their object the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mu-
tual benefit of contracting states; rather, they aim to protect the basic
rights of individuals from encroachments by the state of their nationality
or any other contracting state.130 "In concluding these human rights trea-
ties," the Court found, "the States can be deemed to submit themselves
to a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various
obligations not in relation to other States, but towards all individuals
within their jurisdiction.' 31 The Court buttressed its conclusions by ref-
erence to statements of the European Commission on Human Rights13 2
and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Ge-
nocide Convention Case.133
The Court's general views concerning the nature of human rights
treaties were found to apply with particular force to the American Con-
vention.'3" Unlike other treaties, including the European Convention, the
American Convention confers on individuals the right to file a petition
127. Id.
128. Id. at 46-47.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 47. D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1110 (1982); Imbert, Reservations and Human Rights Conventions, 6 HUM.
RTS. REV. 28 (1981).
131. Effect of Reservations, supra, note 6, I.L.M. 47. Cf. Imbert, supra note 130 at 33:
In a human rights treaty, "one Party's obligations cannot be modified by another Party's
attitude; to allow a State to set aside its obligations simply because another State has con-
ferred this right upon itself by making a reservation would be to detract from the goal that
conventions of this kind pursue, if only because the victim of this reciprocal arrangement
would not be the reserving State but individuals, the persons whom the convention is
designed to protect."
132. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 47-48. See also Application No.
788/60 (Austria v. Italy), 4 Y.B. EUR. CoNV. HUM. RTS. 138, 140 (1961).
133. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 47-48. See also, Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15,
22-23.
134. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 48.
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with the Inter-American Commission against any state that has ratified
the Convention.13 3 States, however, may not institute proceedings against
another state until each has ratified the Convention.'36 This structure, the
Court found, "indicates the overriding importance the Convention at-
taches to the commitments of the States Parties vis-a-vis individuals...
"137
Article 20(4) of the Vienna Convention, providing for the entry into
force of a ratification with a reservation only upon its acceptance by an-
other state, was thus determined to have been intended to apply to a
more traditional treaty arrangement.1 3 8 By contrast, the American Con-
vention was "a multilateral legal instrument or framework enabling
States to make binding unilateral commitments not to violate the human
rights of individuals within their jurisdiction.' 3 9 In this context, the
Court found, article 75 of the Convention must be held to refer to para-
graph 1 of article 20, which addresses those cases in which no subsequent
acceptance of a reservation is required. 4 ° The fact that article 20(1) re-
fers to reservations "expressly authorized by a treaty" was no obstacle;
while the Convention authorizes no specific reservations, the Court con-
cluded, it sanctions in general those reservations that are consistent with
the object and purpose of the Convention.''
In closing, the Court emphasized that its holding was restricted to
reservations compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. 42
As the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the Convention, the Court has
the power to determine what reservations are incompatible and thus void
ab initio.'14 While the Court refused to consider in the abstract what sort
135. Id. at 48. See, Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 44.
136. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 48. See also, Human Rights Con-
vention, supra note 6, art. 45.
137. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 48.
138. Id at 46.
139. Id. at 48.
140. Id. at 49.
141. Id.
142. Id. See also, Koh, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71,
97 (1982).
143. Mr. Golsong has forcefully argued that this is the appropriate result where a tribu-
nal is empowered to interpret and apply a human rights treaty. In such a case, "[flormal
acceptance or formal objection on the part of other Contracting States of one, or several
reservations formulated by another Contracting State can have no juridical validity." Gol-
song, Contribution to the Rome Colloquy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTER-NATIONAL COL-
LOQUY ABOUT THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 271-72 (1975). Imbert; supra
note 130 at 35, noted prior to the question arising before the Inter-American Court that "[a]
solution of this kind would.. .be suited to.. .the American Convention on Human Rights..
. ." Indeed, it would appear to be the case that the view that only organs responsible for
ensuring enforcement of a human rights treaty are qualified to judge the compatibility of
reservations is widely held. Imbert, id. at 36; Cohen-Jonathan, Les Rapports entre la Con-
vention Europeenne des Droits de l'Homme et le Pacte des Nations Unies sur les Droits
Civils et Politiques, in REGIONALISME ET UNIVERSALISME DANS LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL CON-
TEMPORAIN 334-35 (1977).
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of reservation might be deemed to conflict with the object and purpose of
the Convention, it clearly perceived the safeguarding of contracting states
from improper reservations to be an important function of the Court.'44
The opinion of the Court was also important with respect to two pre-
liminary matters relating to competence. First there was the question of
the Court's own competence to hear the case. Since the Secretary General
of the OAS was assigned depositary functions under the Convention,'4 5
and, furthermore, since the past practice of the OAS had been to have the
Secretary General handle disputes concerning ratifications,'4 6 the argu-
ment could be made that the Secretary General rather than the Court
was authorized to settle the main question in the case. The Court had no
hesitancy in declaring that the article 64 explicit grant of power to the
Court to render advisory opinions interpreting the Convention encom-
passed the question posed by the Commission.' 7 The Court distinguished
those treaties with respect to which the Secretary General established its
past practice of dispute resolution, noting that the Convention set up a
formal supervisory mechanism-the Court-for the adjudication of ques-
tions arising under the Convention. 48 The Court's competence in this re-
gard was expressed in article 33(b)'4 9 and reinforced by article 1 of the
Court's Statute, which declares that the Court "is an autonomous judicial
institution whose purpose is the application and interpretation of the
American Convention on Human Rights."' 50
144. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 49. It is also important to note that
any interest other states parties to the Convention have as to reciprocity is protected by art.
21 of the Vienna Convention governing the legal effects of reservations and also incorpo-
rated by reference in the American Convention. Under art. 21, a reservation operates recip-
rocally between the reserving state and any other party, so that it modifies the treaty for
both of them in their mutual relations to the extent of the reserved provisions. The Interna-
tional Law Commission was of the opinion that this rule in large measure safeguarded the
interests of states. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Com-
mission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 18th Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 207. Under the American Convention, therefore, it would not be possible for a state
to enter a complaint against another state before the Commission if the complaining state
had reserved on the gravamen of the complaint.
145. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, arts. 74, 76, 78, 79, 81.
146. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 40. See also Standards on Reser-
vations of Inter-American Multilateral Treaties, OAS G.A. Res. 102 (111-0/73) (April 14,
1973), AG/doc. 375/73 rev. 1, reprinted in OEA/Ser. P/II-0.2, Vol. I (1973).
147. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 40.
148. Id.
149. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(b).
150. Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. For the official text, see
Handbook, supra note 1, at 105, and Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights to the General Assembly, 1980, 16, OEA/Ser. L/V/III.3, doc. 13, Corr. 1 (1981). The
Statute is reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 635 (1980).
Thus the Court rejected the view that the Secretary General is empowered to determine
whether and at what time a ratification is to take effect. While the Secretary General's posi-
tion on the main question in the case was contrary to the Court's holding, (supra note 106
and accompanying text), there is no indication that the Secretary General asserted a pri-
mary power to decide the question.
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Similarly, the Court found that the Inter-American Commission was
competent to request the advisory opinion under article 64 of the Con-
vention.1"' The Court noted that, under article 64, member states of the
OAS enjoy an absolute right to seek advisory opinions.1 52 By contrast,
OAS organs can request advisory opinions only "[w]ithin their spheres of
competence."' 1 3 The Commission is one of the organs listed in Chapter X
of the OAS Charter'84 , which is incorporated by reference in article 64.
Since the Commission has different powers with respect to those member
states that are parties to the Convention and those that are not, 58 it was
imperative for the Commission to know precisely when a reserving state
became a party. The Commission's request was therefore within its
sphere of competence.1 56 Furthermore, the Court observed that, given the
broad powers conferred upon the Commission by the OAS Charter, 57
"the Commission enjoys, as a practical matter, an absolute right to re-
quest an advisory opinion within the framework of article 64(1) of the
Convention." ' Thus, for the purposes of article 64, the Commission
stands on precisely the same footing as a member state of the OAS.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the advent of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, an
additional body has been added to the regional apparatus for the promo-
tion and protection of human rights. Serious and wide-ranging violations
are occurring on a quotidian basis in this hemisphere and one would rival
Dr. Pangloss for optimism if one thought that the establishment of the
court would lead to immediate and dramatic improvements in the obser-
vance of human rights by governments. Nevertheless, our best hope re-
mains in the rule of law and in the institutions dedicated to ensuring its
even-handed, objective enforcement.
The two advisory opinions of the Court should demonstrate to states
the confidence they may place in this new institution. The opinions are
Note also that the Court's position on the scope of the Secretary General's duties as
depositary is supported by the Vienna Convention, art. 77. In its draft form, this article
required that the depositary "examine whether.., an instrument or a reservation is in con-
formity with the provisions of the treaty." Report of the International Law Commission to
the General Assembly, supra note 90, at 269. Despite this apparent command to inspect
reservations, the International Law Commission made it clear that this draft provision was
not ;ntended to make the depositary njudgp of the validity of the reservation. Id. In its final
form, however, art. 77 excludes the examining of reservations from the depositary's func-
tions. It is thus safe to conclude that under the Vienna Convention a depositary is not to
make legal judgments as to the validity of treaties.
151. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 41.
152. The text of art. 64 can be found supra at text of accompanying note 12.
153. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 64(1).
154. See The Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 96.
155. Supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
156. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 at I.L.M. 41.
157. See The Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 96, art. 112.
158. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, I.L.M. 41.
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well-reasoned, lawyer-like products, and correct in their conclusions. We
can only hope that states, with increasing frequency, will resort to the
Court both in its advisory and contentious capacities.

